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ABSTRACT: The Uses of Argument presented Stephen Toulmin’s call for a working
logic and the classical statement of his layout of argument. In chapter 3, which
explicated the model, each element was defined using multiple strategies. Toulmin
presented his terminology both as a category system for labeling statements or
propositions and as a functional vocabulary to describe ‘what . . . is involved in
establishing conclusions by the production of arguments’ (97). These two uses of the
vocabulary did not come together seamlessly in his account, however. Nor have they
done so in subsequent work. Interpretations and elaborations of the Toulmin model,
including Toulmin’s own with Rieke and Janek in An Introduction to Reasoning,
have tended to characterize the overall model functionally but have defined and
illustrated the elements as different kinds of statements. This paper calls for more
attention to a definition for the ‘warrant’ element that emerges from the dialogue
strategy of definition: ‘to warrant’ as a verb capturing the movement between the data
and the claim. The paper argues that the result of this perspective is a more
rhetorically based statement of the Toulmin model.
KEY WORDS: Toulmin, warrant, argument, working logic

In the opening paragraphs of The Uses of Argument (1964), Stephen
Toulmin commits himself to understanding ‘the canons and methods
we use when, in everyday life, we actually assess the soundness,
strength and conclusiveness of arguments’ (1). There are a number of
interesting if not novel elements entailed in this commitment. At its
heart is an assertion that one of the elements of day-to-day language
use is the assessment of argument. The dimensions of this assessment
are designated soundness, strength and conclusiveness. Furthermore,
the raising of the issue of how we actually assess arguments gives the
reader the hint of the differentiation Toulmin will introduce between
the idealized logic of traditional perspectives and his effort to study
working logic: reasoning as it takes place in ‘everyday life.’ Finally,
the commitment posits a discernible system of assessment knowable
through the study of people arguing.
Toulmin’s commitment in those opening paragraphs first

attracted me to his ideas (when the book sold for $1.95). As a student
of rhetorical argument – the ways in which people draw upon the
resources of language to understand their world and cajole each other
to cooperative participation in that endeavor – I found that Toulmin’s
task captured my own. Indeed, in my home discipline of speech
communication Toulmin became the standard introduction to
microargument.
If a layout of argument is to aid the description and assessment
of argument, then its terms and characteristic moves must permit the
casting of the argument that surrounds us every day into its framework.
Those like me who are rhetorical critics must be able to draw upon the
layout to open up the strategic dimensions of argument. More to the
point, everyday users – notably our students – must be able to develop
their abilities with a use of the layout on the fly, as it were. Over the
years, the Toulmin layout has been modestly successful at these tasks.
Occasionally, the layout has been employed in laying out arguments for
analysis, but it cannot be said to have captured totally the market of
rhetorical critics. While the use of the layout in textbooks in
argumentation and even in public speaking is near total, those with
whom I converse about the subject and those I supervise in my
department’s courses in argumentation report that their students suffer
great difficulty in casting argumentative exchanges within the layout.
‘Is this statement data or a warrant?’ is still guaranteed to glaze eyes. In
fact, it is that move – the obligation to recast uttered statements into an
expressive form complying with the linguistic characteristics of data or
warrant – that diminishes the utility of the layout.
Many years ago, in rereading The Uses of Argument, I was
struck by the novelty of his first definition of the terms of the layout: a
conversation between two interlocutors built around the claims of the
first and the skeptical challenges of the second. I observed that seldom
was this schema employed when teaching the Toulmin layout or
conceptualizing argument with its terminology. I committed to doing
so. The result has been a profoundly more useful layout that focuses on
the act of arguing rather than the propositional form of premises.
My task today is to explicate this approach to the layout. I argue
that the key to this interpretation is to recognize that ‘to warrant’ is a
splendid English verb that perfectly captures the dynamic movement of
reasoning in the Toulmin layout. I will argue that the
reconceptualization of argument embodied in the Toulmin model
reaches its full potential to move from a idealized to a working logic
when the requirement to cast arguments into propositions is also left
behind and the layout deployed as a method of portraying the
underlying movement of reasoning. Thus, presenting the key term of
the layout – the warrant – as a verb, the part of speech capturing
movement, best actualizes the working logic.
TO WARRANT AN ARGUMENT
In the essay he calls ‘The Layout of Arguments’ Toulmin offers at least
seven strategies for defining ‘warrant.’ These various strategies do not
leave inconsistency in their wake, but if one seeks to fully appreciate
the difference between the new working logic that Toulmin
championed and the geometrically based logics that he sought to
displace, certain definitions emerge as more effective in assisting the
‘man-in-the-street’ to achieve ‘application to his practice’ (1).
Some of these definitions link the concept of warrant with the
major or middle premise of traditional syllogisms. Following a reprisal
of the famous syllogism establishing Socrates’ mortality, Toulmin
works toward a similar argument about the Swede Petersen’s

Protestantism (108-10). He is exploring the differences in expression in
arguments in which the backing replaces stated warrants. In case we
miss the link to syllogistic logic he proffers: ‘The relevance of our
distinction to the traditional conception of ‘formal validity’ should
already be becoming apparent’ (110). We do not, of course, want to
lose sight of the purpose of the strategy on these pages: drawing upon
the syllogistic analogy permits the clearest statement of the distinction
between the syllogistic or analytic argument and substantial argument.
In this example Toulmin is making the point that in everyday discourse
it is most often the backing to the warrant that is stated, not the warrant
itself.
Unfortunately to my mind, Toulmin like Sisyphus loses much
of the uniqueness of a working logic the farther he goes toward
developing this example. His rather awkward prose rendering of the
argument translates easily into his layout, but at the price of insight into
the generalization of his procedure to natural prose expressions. The
same problem continues as universal premises are explored in
observations about our club-footed friend Jack (113-18). Taken
together with the next section, which draws together arguments about
the Bermudan Harry and Jack’s sister Anne’s red hair to make the
distinction between substantial and analytic arguments (118-24),
Toulmin’s treatment returns the effort at distinction to the old strategic
problem of casting arguments into proper expressive form as an avenue
toward testing their logical validity. Thus, the search for a working
logic returns to the characteristic moves of the idealized logic. This
confusion has led many to see Toulmin’s model as less than novel, or
as Brockriede and Ehninger (1960) put it as ‘a syllogism lying on its
side’ (47).
A second definitional strategy exploits a different analogy – the
law courts. Toulmin compares the warrant to points of law. ‘This
distinction, between data and warrants, is similar to the distinction
drawn in the law-courts between questions of fact and questions of law,
and the legal distinction is indeed a special case of the more general
one – we may argue, for instance, that a man whom we know to have
been born in Bermuda is presumably a British subject, simply because
the relevant laws give us a warrant to draw this conclusion’ (100). In
the end, this statement dissolves the analogy into an argument by
division. The important confusion to me is that the argument’s
reference to the power of relevant laws to supply a warrant, combined
with the specific to more general reasoning (or vice versa), leaves
behind the impression of warrants as formal statements of relationship
contextualized within general principles.
Although I find this characteristic unfortunate, Toulmin does
not. Although he repeatedly makes the point that in working logic ‘data
are appealed to explicitly, warrants implicitly’ (100), he often offers
warrants in propositional form. In the analogy to the law, the reference
is to positive or written law. There are, in the law books, written
specifications that are (in the force of this statement of the analogy) the
implicit warrants of the argument.
Having this point fresh in our minds, it is a propitious time to
introduce a distinction that sorts Toulmin’s strategies for me. In the two
strategies we have just considered, warrants are propositional. They
have substance which they lend to the argument. Is the propositional
nature of legal statutes a characteristic shared by their special character
and the general character of warrants, or does the propositional
character represent a dimension of what makes them special? In fact,
read in context what makes them special is that they are part of the
field of law. Thus, we are led to believe that all warrants have tacit, but
fundamental, propositional character. Shortly I will suggest that other

definitional strategies release us from this propositional form to
emphasize, in preference to their propositional quality, the power of
warrants to authorize the movement from data to claim.
Perhaps the propositional definitions reach their most troubling
manifestation in a third strategy of definition: ‘general, hypothetical
statements, which can act as bridges, and authorise the sort of step to
which our particular argument commits us. These may normally be
written very briefly (in the form ‘If D, then C’)’ (98). Despite the fact
that Toulmin goes on to complicate this propositional expression, the
simple statement of hypothetical – if D, then C – is too often taken to
be the field-invariant propositional form of a warrant, the propositional
content only being fielddependent. Today I encounter teachers adopting this simple definition
of warrants and encouraging students that warrants are as simple as
stating: if D, then C. This, of course, trivializes the function of
warrants. As a working logic it makes it easy to state warrants for
arguments, but leaves us without what Toulmin points to as the
problem required to move beyond the trivial case: the requirement that
the hypotheticals be authenticated.
It is the search for authentication that takes us away from the
propositional statements, for now the emphasis shifts from the form of
the proposition to its function. The fourth strategy of definition is
transitional: ‘warrants . . . correspond to the practical standards or
canons of argument’ (98). There is, of course, considerable difference
between ‘canons’ and ‘practical standards.’ The former imply a refined
sort of knowledge in which contemplation and careful sorting elevate
certain propositions to a level of acceptance that others do not receive.
Canons are socially authorized in an extended process of refinement.
Practical standards seem to receive their status through a more
commonly enacted day-to-day refinement of experience.
The movement to practical standards I take as a significant
move. For Toulmin with this simple move carries us from a formal
refinement by experts, perhaps even by idealized logicians, into a
socially functioning everyday practical activity in which normal blokes
acquire a practical knowledge of what data warrants important claims.
In this pair Toulmin gives us our first glimpse of his later distinction
between warrant-using and warrant-establishing arguments. Warrants
have become the product of socially constructed argumentative
processes – formal and informal. The conjunction Toulmin has
constructed portrays the broad assertion that the social processes of
warrant husbandry mark scientific and other academic disciplines, the
law, and ordinary day-to-day interaction. Practicality drives canonized
and non-canonized reasoning.
This ambiguous functionality also marks the fifth definition of
warrant: ‘propositions of a . . . kind: rules, principles, inferencelicences, or what you will’ (98). Rules suggest the kind of carefully
performed sifting that canons of argument suggests. Principles
transcend the process of canonization, seemingly signifying products
that have attained a status generally recognized. The more infrequently
encountered term ‘inference-licences’ expresses the full functional
perspective on the warrant. Licenses convey the attained authority, in
this case the authority of data to establish claims. The warrants remain
propositions, but they now become warrants not by virtue of their form
but by virtue of their power, their authority. The imprecision of the last
phrase in Toulmin’s definition – ‘or what you will’ – indicates more
clearly that this list of terms communicates not the status of the
propositions but their function to authorize the move from data to
claim.
This move to the functional becomes explicit in a sixth

definition of warrant. Toulmin observes: ‘The question will be asked,
how absolute is this distinction between data, on the one hand, and
warrants, on the other.’ The problem he posits is the bane of those
trying to teach ordinary arguers – read students – to differentiate
propositions that are claims, from those that are data, from those that
are warrants. He answers: ‘By grammatical tests alone, the distinction
may appear far from absolute, and the same English sentence may
serve a double function: it may be uttered, that is, in one situation to
convey a piece of information, in another to authorise a step in an
argument, and even perhaps in some contexts to do both these things at
once’ (99). Here is the ultimate problem of sorting propositions into the
layout and what ultimately differentiates the layout and its working
logic from idealized logic. The form of the sentence does not permit the
separation. You cannot simply look at a sentence and tell the function it
is serving. Gone are the possibilities of readily seeing the form ‘if D,
then C’ and saying, ‘Aha! a warrant.’ Propositions are warrants as they
perform the function of warrants, as they authorize the taking of data as
proof of a claim. They turn the pedagogic attention from teaching
students to recognize the form of statements to recognizing the way in
which statements function in the generation of faith in a claim.
In my judgment, Toulmin’s seventh strategy (and, by the way,
the earliest strategy presented in the essay) is the most fruitful in
teaching the layout of argument. This is the conversation, the narrative
of accomplished argument. I quote at length:
Let it be supposed that we make an assertion, and commit ourselves
thereby to the claim which any assertion necessarily involves. If this claim is
challenged, we must be able to establish it – that is, make it good, and show
that it was justifiable. How is this to be done? Unless the assertion was made
quite wildly and irresponsibly, we shall normally have some facts to which
we can point in its support: if the claim is challenged, it is up to us to appeal
to these facts, and present them as the foundation upon which our claim is
based. . . .
We already have, therefore, one distinction to start with: between
the claim or conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish (C) and the
facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim – what I shall refer to as our
data (D). If our challenger’s question is, ‘What have you got to go on?’,
producing the data or information on which the claim is based may serve to
answer him; but this is only one of the ways in which our conclusion may be
challenged. Even after we have produced our data, we may find ourselves
again asked further questions of another kind. We may now be required not
to add factual information to that which we have already provided, but rather
to indicate the bearing on our conclusion of the data already produced.
Colloquially, the question may now be, not ‘What have you got to go on?’,
but ‘How do you get there?’. To present a particular set of data as the basis
for some specified conclusion commits us to a certain step; and the question
is now one about the nature and justification of this step. (97-98)

Toulmin has posited the archetypal case of argument as a conversation
in which an interlocutor challenges the grounds of our making a claim.
The challenges are of different types because the questions asked are
different questions. One seeks information, the other expresses the
skepticism that the information provided satisfies the demand for
support for the claim. By casting the process in the form of a
conversation rather than in the form of propositional layout Toulmin
has refocused our attention on the function our statements serve in
arguing.
I now reach the edge of Toulmin’s treatment in ‘The Layout of
Arguments’ and go further than he goes. I ask: Why should the

response to this second question be labeled ‘warrant’? The answer is
found in the English verb, ‘to warrant’: ‘to provide adequate grounds
for; justify; to grant authorization or sanction to (someone); authorize
or empower’ (American Heritage Dictionary). The question, rephrased
in our terminology becomes: How does that data warrant that claim?
The verb form removes even the last vestiges of the
requirement that the form of the warrant be propositional. The
functional is the essence. To be sure, propositional statements may be
generated to satisfy the warrant challenge, but the warrant function is
the relationship between the data and the claim: the authorization of the
step.
WARRANTING AS A WORKING LOGIC
The functional emphasis transforms the warranting concept into the
synthetic heart of the working logic. To the arguer, the key choice is
the selection of information (data) to support (warrant) the claim. The
geometry of the argument becomes linear, but linear with multiple and
complex vectors. Arguments emerge out of the assertions and
challenges as interlocutors negotiate the warranting of the claim.
Warranting challenges may be met by the selection of alternative
information (data), by the assertion of the authority of the information
to prove the claim (backing), or by the generation of chained arguments
in which the arguer makes claims about the relationships of data and
claim – in Toulmin’s terms warrant-establishing arguments. The
dialectic that marks the skeptical relationship of the interlocutors is the
search for data that warrants the claim. When the strength of the
warranting relationship is successfully challenged, the options of
identifying special limiting conditions (rebuttal) and recognizing the
shading of probabilities (qualifiers) provide other options for the arguer
negotiating the strength of his/her argument with the interlocutor.
The functional emphasis also expands the scope of argument by
placing the individual microargument into a judgment contextualized
beyond its own terms. This expansion results from the idea that the
warranting power of data transcends the individual argument. An
arguer selects data that s/he anticipates will warrant the claim. That
power – that authority – lies in the complex warrant-establishing
process. The licensing quality of warrants that Toulmin describes
grows from the transcendent, socially constructed, authority of a field.
The social complex that makes arguments go has the sensitivity to the
warranting power of information at its heart.
The power of warrants thus lies at the intersection of two
dimensions: the pragmatic and the social. A working logic is the
product of argumentative language acts that refine and work through a
kind of Darwinian testing of the quality of warrants. Warrants that lead
to faulty decisions – decisions that lead to unwise actions – have their
authority eroded in their pragmatic use. Warrants that show wisdom
have their authority reinforced. This evaluation is carried in the social
knowledge that resides in the field of the interlocutors.
In describing this central role for warrants, we have touched on
the major elements that set Toulmin’s working logic apart from
idealized logic: the secondary triad, the idea of warrant-using and
warrant-establishing arguments, the context of fields as active elements
of argument. So the functional definitions carry the virtues of
Toulmin’s critique. The synthetic power of functional definitions
captures the multiple dimensions that shape an argument in the
Toulmin system.
THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS VIEW OF WARRANT

I began this exploration of a functional view of warrant with a very
pragmatic diagnosis of the Toulmin model: my students could not
readily analyze an argument, discuss its working with the Toulmin
terminology, then think through its weaknesses, measurably better than
they could with other ways of treating argument. Nor was the
terminology particularly dominant as a language for rhetorical critics
who are so often interested in argument.1 So I return now to a bald
claim: my students work more easily with a functional notion of
warrants, and I find the synthetic character of the functional definitions
much more conducive to the full understanding of argumentative
complexes.
I cannot generate any systematic data to support my claim for
the students’ ease of use, but I can report my long experience in the
classroom. Furthermore, I think I understand why the process is so
much easier. First, the most difficult process in logical analysis for
students is the process of turning normal English sentences into
propositional form. In the functional deployment of the layout, they do
not need to do so. They simply need to understand the three functions
at the heart of the model: claiming, supporting, and warranting. What is
your claim? What data will you offer to support it? Why do you think
that data warrants that claim? Consider a simple and actual example:
Bonnie: I am afraid you will not be able to graduate in May.
Jeremy: Why not?
Bonnie: You failed to file the Application for Diploma form by
the February deadline.
Jeremy: I thought they were fairly lenient with deadlines on this
paperwork?
Bonnie: Generally they are, but not with that form. Long
experience tells us that is the one deadline you better not
miss.
No need to work through translation problems here. Bonnie’s claim is
clear. She is shown responding to Jeremy’s doubt with a fact
explaining his problem. His effort to doubt the authority of her fact to
warrant her claim is met with a sophisticated response: backing and
rebuttal.
No doubt part of the secret here is the conversational model. In
deciding the strategy to present this view of argument, I pondered
whether the proper stress was on the warrant as a verb or on the
conversation as a paradigm case of argument. Toulmin’s standard
conversation and the specific variations on it present the interplay of
assertion and skeptical challenge that constitutes the dialectic of
argument. The conversation stresses that the notion of ‘making an
argument’ as the expressive assertion of a single arguer oversimplifies
the more subtle calculation of interactional awareness that we stress in
talking about rhetorical argument. Indeed, one message I often deliver
to students terrified about the possibility of debate, where an
interlocutor could actually tell them their argument was not convincing,
is that the debater is the lucky one: she knows where her interlocutor’s
resistance is. The public speaker must arrive at the issues of resistance
in the face of silence.
I am mindful, of course, that insisting that translation into a
conversation be substituted for translation into propositions is still a
translation into a form with the attendant difficulties. Even though I
believe that conversational form is a more natural form for a working
logic, I believe the conversational model teaches differently than the
propositional. The conversational model is a pedagogic strategy for

teaching the interactive function of claim, data, and warrant. That
lesson learned, the analysis of individual arguments ought to feature an
appreciation for the functioning of the argument without translation
into conversational form. In propositional analysis, on the other hand,
translation into propositions is a necessary step. Indeed, the probative
power of propositional analysis lies in the translation into propositions.
It is translating the stuff of argument into propositional form that
allows formal assessment to proceed.2 Thus, I believe that the essential
lesson I wish to teach ordinary arguers is the functional relationships in
argument, not the conversational form.
Furthermore, although the conversational form may more
directly record many cases of working logic, other cases are in other
forms. A few paragraphs ago I highlighted my claim that students
found the functional approach easier to employ. I acknowledged a
characteristic of the field as I anticipated the interlocutor’s expectation
that I might produce systematic evidence of this greater ease. But I
rejected that strategy for warranting my claim, asserting instead the
rather vague authority of my experience. Indeed, this is an argument
where the backing is explicit and the data implicit in the argument. In
re-presenting that argument I have not cast it into the conversational
form (although I have used that metaphor a bit in describing my
strategic choices). I have instead featured the ways the various
statements of the argument relate functionally to each other in
producing my argumentative effect.
Still another advantage my students demonstrate in learning the
model functionally is their greater ability to think through the options
defined by the central role of the warrant as a synthetic pivot of
assertion and challenge. When the authority of warranting is
challenged, they can see the catalog of moves open to the arguer. They
develop a feel for the nature of the challenge and the appropriateness of
alternative data, backing, rebuttal, qualification, or chain argument.
The centrality of warranting in the functional definition also
facilitates my students’ ability to use the model in assessment. They
quickly perceive the context of the argument in a field. The social test –
Is that the data that warrants that sort of claim in that field? – comes
more naturally as a question. But once that question is asked, the
question turns to: Why not? If not, how might the claim be warranted?
What are the restrictions of the field? How does that field establish
warrants? Are there possibilities to strengthen the argument? This
fundamental distinction between idealized logic and working logic
becomes a plausible way of thinking through arguments.
The result for me is a more consistent pedagogy of argument.
Students work more easily with the ultimate questions of perceiving,
testing, challenging, and strengthening arguments. But they also
perceive argument as a fundamental language activity through which
humans negotiate their daily lives.
I also asserted that to a rhetorical critic like me the synthetic
power of warranting arguments permitted a fuller vocabulary for
dealing with the texture of argument. I would point to some past and
forthcoming work on the Bush administration’s arguments for the Iraqi
war as illustrative (Klumpp). I would also call attention to the recent
drama in the United States over the fate of Terry Schiavo. The loud and
splintering texture of public argument over the fate of this unfortunate
woman and its implications for fundamental issues of life and death
opens in so many ways to a rich consideration of issues of warranting.
The contrast of argument in the legal field to argument in the streets;
the technical involvement of Congressional action; the role of the field
of medicine versus the human connection of a mother and father;
differences in the acceptable evidence of meaningful life; all of the

bypassing that constitutes the differing positions on these issues take on
apparent texture as the intersection of various fields of argument and
the warranting practices that define each. While the constraints of this
essay do not permit a full elaboration of this episode, consider only the
bypassing over the question of Terry Schiavo’s responsiveness to those
around her. The legal system relies on the diagnosis of medical experts
to warrant its conclusion that Schiavo exists in a ‘persistent vegetative
state.’ The medical profession has specific criteria for such a state, and
telemetry and specific diagnostic techniques provide data to experts
trained in medicine with which they warrant their claim. The streets see
instead a videotape of Schiavo with eyes aimed in the direction of the
disembodied voice of her mother. Connectedness is perceived in the
image constituting the human responsiveness that parents perceive in
their children as love. Clearly these are two different fields. The latter
does not constitute evidence for the court, nor is medical testimony
relevant to the street. Indeed, an interesting moment occurs when
Senator Bill Frist, Senate majority leader and a trained and licensed
physician, attempts to bridge these fields by asserting his medical
credentials and claiming diagnosis via the videotape. His statement is
met with doubts about medical personnel who would diagnose via
videotape. Clearly the issues of what warrants claims of human
responsiveness and the contrasting contexts of fields accepting claims
only by their own acceptable warranting help to define the bypassing
that marks the conflict between the courts and the streets.
A FINAL THOUGHT
I have not asked Toulmin why he chose the term ‘warrant’ for this
element of the pentad. And to the best of my reading he never explains
the choice in Uses. The most common definition of the noun ‘warrant’
points to the legal document issued by a court authorizing action by the
court’s officials. That kind of image of formal proceedings to authorize
action distorts the more informal sense of appropriateness captured in a
working logic. To me, the more straightforward definition of ‘to
warrant’ – ‘to provide adequate grounds for; justify; to grant
authorization or sanction to (someone); authorize or empower’ – better
achieves the distinctiveness of a working logic. I propose a change of
emphasis, a tilting from one definitional strategy in ‘The Layout of
Arguments’ to another. I frankly admit that I propose an elaboration
toward rhetorical argument with its focus on explaining the
argumentative workings of everyday arguers and away from the
validity concerns of logicians. Thus, I urge diminished urgency for the
search for the propositional linkages of data to claim. Instead, I believe
that a greater concern for the functional relationships that define the
layout of argument promises a more vital approach to the working logic
that Toulmin and I seek.
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